While I use the term ‘existential faggotry’ quite loosely, in this case leftist existential faggotry refers to the psycho-spiritual tendency among the left in which the drive toward meaning and struggle, increasingly denied to people in the modern world, becomes sublimated in such a manner so that problems are perceived and causes pursued, often on behalf of other people, in order to define and form one’s sense of self.
What makes this tendency ghey is its overbearing and sanctimonious belief that vacuous ‘support’ (i.e., approval or favorable opinion) forms the most essential element of moral or political value. This naturally leads to a heavy degree of sectarianism, with members of the left, especially far left, accusing of each other of not being ‘real’ leftists or Communists, etc, based on the degree to which they subscribe to various abstract, theoretical analyses.
From the outside, this makes the leftist insufferable. ‘Lol, dude, that’s not the left,’ is the earnest response of every leftist to a critique of the left. Viewed from the inside, this constant state of internecine debate, often over the most mundane molehills turned into mountains, seems like a great weakness. It prevents any real unity in action and stems the development of ‘revolutionary’ coalitions, so it’s told.
But perhaps this culture of moral grandstanding against each other is actually a strength. Through constant division and fighting over what ‘left’ means among the left, all sorts of crazy ideas can be introduced and presented as ‘left,’ even if most leftists don’t necessarily accept them. From among these ideas, it’s easily for the ruling elite to pick the most convenient (e.g., the feminization of men as a social cause). In this manner, the overton window is shifted, or constantly on the brink of being shifted, by the left.
This ‘strength’ doesn’t exist on the right. Those on the right are less impelled by a suppressed drive to meaning and struggle sublimated into ideology and activism. Some on the right may believe that many others on the right are retards, fags, or cucks, but there isn’t as much polemicizing about what ‘right’ ‘really’ means. Even if there may be large gulfs in beliefs and values among the right, they’re more readily overlooked or at least not obsessed over. At most, you get memes about ‘cuckservatives’ and RHINOs.
Two other tendencies compound the ability of the left the shift the overton window so quickly and effectively.
The biggest strength of the left is that there is a general consensus among them that they want to change the world. Among them, those on the far left consciously see themselves as a ‘vanguard’ or leading edge of change even within the wider left. Even in a context of widespread incompetence and naivety, organizational disarray, and sectarianism, this sets the left at a distinct advantage. Change is, after all, a constant. (“This too shall pass.”) Thus, when only one side widely agrees that they want change, this obviously puts them in a favorable position to determine the direction that change will occur.
This brings us to the right. It not only lacks real unity, but fewer people offer positive visions for the future. Instead, a significant proportion of the right are stuck on ‘conservatism’ as a rhetorical banner or simply ‘tradition’ as a central proposition (i.e., halting or slowing change). That is, among the right, there are fewer voices offering visions for what the future ought to look like beyond superficial mythologies about what the past looked like. In a struggle between one side hoping to change the future and another hoping to hold onto the past, the latter is at a natural disadvantage, especially over time. Even incremental, 1% victories by the former will result in the eventual triumph of those calling for change over those attempting to fortify or resurrect tradition.
So we have two problems for the right. First, it’s less likely to operate in a conceptual context of striving for change, or rather, to control the direction that change that will occur; and secondly, there are far fewer among the right who see themselves as a vanguard pushing for more fleshed-out conceptions of what right ‘really’ means within a wider conceptual framework of striving for change in a particular direction.
Allow me to help correct this grave error now: first, by offering a broad conceptual framework for what ‘right’ means (in a big tent sense) in contrast to the left (also in a broad sense); then, by presenting a more restricted version of rightist ethics that might inform political and social prescriptions for change.
Let’s start broadly. What does ‘right’ and ‘left’ mean? Or rather, how are they best understood?
Right: Greatness through distinction with unity, order, love, and respect
Left: Equality by division, conflict, and resentment
This definition of the right deals specifically with principle-informed goals in the broad sense: striving to create a society in which distinction is utilized as a means of promoting greatness while engendering unity, order, love, and respect.
The definition of the left deals both with its conscious goal (equality) while highlighting the quality of its operating spirit (division, conflict, and resentment).
But what of ethics and specifics? If various traditions or traditional identities are understood to be insufficient as a winning core to right wing political philosophy, what underlying ethical considerations might be available to rightists in shaping ‘vanguard’ propositions for future change?
As I’ve outlined elsewhere, I advocate for a specific form of adaptive virtue ethics. That is, ethics is defined by habitual behavior and character which, as a rule, lead to individual and societal thriving. As such, the vision for the future I propose is one in which the state directly participates in and encourages the mass cultivation of individuals characterized to various degrees by strength, intelligence, creativity, health, empathy, honor, discipline, drive, etc. This, on one hand, offers a contending vision for the future which challenges the ghey, gray, globohomo-adjacent, equality-obsessed propositions emanating out of the left, and, on the other hand, offers something both more compelling, substantive, and palatably aggressive than the gamut of ‘conservatives,’ ‘tradcons,’ and wignats on the right.
This, I believe, is inclusive enough of those on the broadly-defined right while simultaneously begins to offers crisper visions for change capable of actually countering and seizing initiative from the left.
Bugman Revolt 